Broadly, economic structuralism rests on the idea that concentrated market structures promote anticompetitive forms of conduct. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and expand widely instead.
This Act prohibited price discrimination by retailers among producers and by producers among retailers. With its missionary zeal for consumers, Amazon has marched toward monopoly by singing the tune of contemporary antitrust.
Part I gives an overview of the shift in antitrust away from economic structuralism in favor of price theory and identifies how this departure has played out in two areas of enforcement: Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth—reporting double-digit increases in net sales yearly—it reports meager profits, choosing to invest aggressively instead.
Notably, the present approach fails even if one believes that antitrust should promote only consumer interests. Subscribing to this view, courts blocked mergers that they determined would lead to anticompetitive market structures.
By refocusing attention back on process and structure, this approach would be faithful to the legislative history of major antitrust laws. By the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized and gave effect to this congressional intent.
Congress, as well as state legislatures, viewed predatory pricing as a tactic used by highly capitalized firms to bankrupt rivals and destroy competition—in other words, as a tool to concentrate control.
Rather than pegging competition to a narrow set of outcomes, this approach would examine the competitive process itself. In some instances, this meant halting horizontal deals—mergers combining two direct competitors operating in the same market or product line—that would have handed the new entity a large share of the market.
Antitrust doctrine has evolved to reflect this redefinition. Empirical studies revealing that the consumer welfare frame has resulted in higher prices—failing even by its own terms—support the need for a different approach. But the consumer welfare approach to antitrust is unduly narrow and betrays congressional intent, as evident from legislative history and as documented by a vast body of scholarship.
Part VI offers two approaches for addressing the power of dominant platforms: Other frozen pie manufacturers, including Continental, began selling at below-cost prices in the Salt Lake City market, while keeping prices in other regions at or above cost.
The case involved cigarette manufacturing, an industry dominated by six firms. The modern view of integration largely assumes away barriers to entry, an element of structure, presuming that any advantages enjoyed by the integrated firm trace back to efficiencies.
B, this idea contravenes legislative history, which shows that Congress passed antitrust laws to safeguard against excessive concentrations of private power. In this view, even if an integrated firm did not directly resort to exclusionary tactics, the arrangement would still increase barriers to entry by requiring would-be entrants to compete at two levels.
By instead relying primarily on price and output effects as metrics of competition, enforcers risk overlooking the structural weakening of competition until it becomes difficult to address effectively, an approach that undermines consumer welfare.
Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend. Part II questions this narrow focus on consumer welfare as largely measured by prices, arguing that assessing structure is vital to protect important antitrust values.
An approach that took these factors seriously would involve an assessment of how a market is structured and whether a single firm had acquired sufficient power to distort competitive outcomes. A flourmill that also owned a bakery could hike prices or degrade quality when selling to rival bakers—or refuse to do business with them entirely.
First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have rewarded. My argument is that gauging real competition in the twenty-first century marketplace—especially in the case of online platforms—requires analyzing the underlying structure and dynamics of markets.
Prior to the alleged predation, Utah Pie had controlled In his highly influential work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork asserted that the sole normative objective of antitrust should be to maximize consumer welfare, best pursued through promoting economic efficiency.Dear Twitpic Community - thank you for all the wonderful photos you have taken over the years.
We have now placed Twitpic in an archived state. The Department of English, encompasses our undergraduate English programme as well as more specialist disciplines such as Creative Writing and Publishing which enables us to offer exceptional Masters and PhD course across English.
Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt.
She developed many of her ideas in response to the rise of totalitarianism in the C20th, partly informed by her own experience as a Jew in Nazi Germany before her escape to France and then America.
Das Digital-Telegramm von Heute: Täglich Neuigkeiten und Informationen aus der Welt der Technik und Games in unserer Fotoshow zum Durchklicken! Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce.
In addition to being a retailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space.
Ithaka by C.P. Cavafy () As you set out for Ithaka hope your road is a long one, full of adventure, full of discovery. Laistrygonians, Cyclops.Download